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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between corruption and decentralisa-
tion from a macroeconomic perspective. Providing a macroeconomic analy-
sis may help to understand better the links and channels between corruption,
decentralisation and economic development. The analysis presented in this
paper is unique in that provides an explicit formulation of the relationship
between corruption, decentralisation and economic development. We bring
together the theoretical and empirical predictions of both the traditional
and modern ﬁscal federalism theories and ﬁnd that the eﬀect of decentral-
isation on development depends crucially on the existence and extent of
corruption. Without corruption, decentralisation is unambiguously the best
outcome for development. However, if corruption is pervasive, decentrali-
sation may be associated to lower capital accumulation than centralisation.
This result is more likely to be observed in developing countries with weak
local political institutions and signiﬁcant information asymmetries between
the government and local administrations.
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1 Background and motivation
Our motivation in this chapter stems from the need to address the relationship
between decentralisation and corruption from a macroeconomic perspective, con-
sidering the various interdependencies between these aspects. In order to do so,
we bring together three diﬀerent strands of literature to present an integrated
analysis that has been relatively absent in the literature. Firstly, we invoke the
traditional ﬁscal federalism literature and its eﬀects on eﬃciency. The second
strand is related to the role of information asymmetries and control mechanisms
in hierarchical organisations. The ﬁnal topic concerns the eﬀects of bureaucratic
corruption on economic development. The novelty of this study lies in the use
of a dynamic growth model to analyse the relationship between decentralisation,
corruption and growth. To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst study us-
ing such an approach to analyse the relationship between these three variables1.
Our main result highlights the role of corruption and information asymmetries
in determining whether decentralisation is preferred to centralisation in terms of
economic development.
The traditional theory of ﬁscal federalism provides strong implications in terms
of the eﬃciency of the decentralised provision of public goods and services. The
theoretical literature has recognised the positive eﬀects that decentralised public
spending has on growth. Since the early contributions of Samuelson and Mus-
grave2, the theory of ﬁscal federalism has supported the view that decentralisation
increases economic welfare by “tailoring outputs of such goods and services to the
particular preferences and circumstances of their constituencies” [Oates (1999), p.
1122-23]. The Decentralization Theorem [Oates (1972)] establishes a presumption
in support of decentralised provision of public goods and services on the grounds of
eﬃciency. As Oates (1999) argues, this presumption is likely to be more justiﬁed
in the presence of information asymmetries and political constraints. Additionally,
the potential gains from decentralization increase if the demand for local public
goods is highly inelastic, an idea that ﬁnds support in the econometric evidence.
Furthermore, the welfare gains from decentralization are enhanced by the "voting
1Ellis and Dincer (2004) model the relationship between decentralization and corruption but
their study is based and formalized using the idea of yardstick competition.
2See Oates (2005) for a detailed review of these early contributions and their importance on
the ﬁscal federalism literature.
2with the feet" and the mobile households arguments, although they are not depen-
dent on that assumption. More recently, Brueckner (1999, 2006) has shown that
federalism increases the incentive to save and ultimately leads to higher economic
growth. The presumption of the existence of signiﬁcant eﬃciency and welfare gains
associated to the decentralised provision of public goods has also found support
in recent empirical evidence [Yilmaz (1999), Lin and Liu (200), Akai and Sakata
(2002), Thiessen (2003) and Stansel (2005)]3. In sum, there appears to be both
theoretical and empirical arguments to expect a positive eﬀect of decentralised
provision of public goods and services on eﬃciency and welfare4
Other strand of the literature addresses the role of incentives, information asymme-
tries and monitoring in organizations. More generally, this literature is concerned
with the role of asymmetric information in a principal-subordinate relationship.
One of the main implications of these models is that decentralisation in the context
of hierarchical organisations may lead to higher corruption. In a very inﬂuential
paper, Aghion and Tirole (1997) show that if the information asymmetry between
principal and subordinate is signiﬁcant, real authority rests with the subordinate.
This also tends to raise the monitoring cost for the principal. As Carbonara (1998)
notes in relation to Aghion and Tirole (1997), delegation of formal authority low-
ers the principal’s incentive to perform their screening and detection activities,
decentralisation encourage corrupt activities. The last paper shows that decen-
tralisation of authority may increase corruption under some conditions. Similar
ideas are also presented by Bac (1996) who argues that ﬂatter hierarchies are pre-
ferred when government monitoring is not specialized. In other words, due to the
larger and wider span of control that the government has on steeper hierarchies, a
more centralised organisation is more convenient. Both the bureaucracy and the
government are hierarchical organizations and some of the aspects regarding its
internal information and coordination relationships may be analysed and inter-
preted using these theories. If we agree that decentralisation involve the creation
of intermediate decisional layers consisting of public agents in charge of certain
3Earlier studies including Davoodi and Zou (1998) and Zhang and Zou (1998), Woller and
Phillips (1998) found no signiﬁcant association between decentralisation and growth.
4There are three main drawbacks of federalism and decentralised provision of public goods:
the sacriﬁce of economies of scale in the provision of certain public goods and services, losses
associated to inter-jurisdictional tax competition and the issue of public-good spillovers and
inter-jurisdictional externalities. While these have been noted in the literature, their extent and
signiﬁcance appear to limited to speciﬁc sets of public goods and services, taxes and infrastruc-
ture expenditures.
3decisions, then these ideas of formal and real authority, information asymmetries
and deﬁcient monitoring are certainly important in the debate of the relationship
between decentralisation and corruption.
Finally, the third strand of the literature we bring into our theoretical model is
related to the eﬀect of corruption on economic development. Although some time
ago there were suggestions that bureaucratic corruption could foster eﬃciency
and development, the view in recent decades is that corruption has a negative
eﬀect on economic development. This eﬀect operates through diﬀerent channels
among which the diversion of resources away from productive activities is one of
the most important. This has been suggested both in theoretical studies [Murphy
et al. (1991, 1993), Romer (1994)] and empirical studies [Mauro (1995), Brunetti
(1997), Hines (1995) and Kaufmann et al. (1999)]. At the same time, there is a
growing literature that acknowledges the existence bi-directional relationship be-
tween corruption and development. The main proposition of these studies is that
bureaucratic corruption and development are jointly determined where equilib-
rium behaviour is dependent on the decisions of other agents. Multiple equilibria
are typical in these models which predict a two-way negative relationship between
corruption and development. This literature also explains the existence and persis-
tence of corruption as a permanent feature of the economy [Ehrlich and Lui (1999),
Mauro (2004), Aidt et al. (2005) and Blackburn et al. (2006)]. These theoretical
presumptions have received some support in a few empirical studies [Haque and
Kneller (2004), Aidt et al. (2005) and Mendez and Sepulveda (2006)] who have
found a non-monotonic relationship between corruption and development.
Having already established the motivation of our research, it is important to note
the relevance of the topic analysed in this chapter. The relationship between de-
centralisation and development has received an increasing share of research eﬀort
over recent decades. This is in part a consequence of a global trend towards devo-
lution and decentralisation5, most notably in developing and transition economies.
5 Although often used as equivalent, concepts such as decentralisation, deconcentration and
devolution refer to slightly diﬀerent and particular aspects of the relations between central and
periphery governments. We will refer to decentralisation to describe any type of power shift away
from the centre while we will use diﬀerent concepts of decentralisation (administrative, ﬁscal,
political, etc.) in diﬀerent sections of this chapter. Manor (1999) describes the diﬀerent concepts
of decentralisation in the following three types: a) deconcentration or administrative decentral-
isation; b) ﬁscal decentralisation; and c) devolution or democratic (political) decentralisation.
Other useful references on this are UNDP (1999) and Treisman (2002).
4A large number of countries have implemented programmes and strategies to
redesign the relationship between diﬀerent levels of government [Manor (1999),
UNFPA (2000), Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2003)]. Industrialized countries have
voluntarily taken steps to decentralize the provision of certain public services and
adopted more decentralised schemes of power sharing. In these countries, the main
objective has been to improve the delivery of public services and to adapt govern-
ment structures to better suit the needs of the citizens. This is for example, the
case of the decentralisation of service delivery in the UK since the early 1980’s.
The introduction of neighborhood oﬃces to improve access to certain services had
limited success but created the foundations for other reforms as in the case of the
decentralisation of the UK health system [Leach et al. (1994)]. Similarly there
have been signiﬁcant transfers of powers to the National Parliaments of Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland.
In the case of developing countries, the decision to redeﬁne the relations between
government levels was mainly driven by the recommendations from international
organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations. The main objec-
tives behind such recommendations were those of promoting development through
the rearrangement of ﬁscal, political and administrative relations between govern-
ments and strengthening civil and democratic institutions. Whether voluntarily
adopted or externally dictated, there is little doubt that decentralisation strategies
have been encouraged primarily on the grounds of the perceived beneﬁts found in
the traditional theory of ﬁscal federalism, i.e. eﬃciency in public provision and
intergovernmental competition and greater matching of local needs with provi-
sion. In addition to this, decentralisation has also been supported by the view
that centralised socialist regimes failed to generate conditions leading to sustained
growth. The experiences of China, India and Russia are good examples of this. In
any case, as Manor (1999) argues, almost every country has adopted some form
of decentralisation over the last decades based on the general presumption that
it would provide a solution to many diﬀerent kind of problems which centralised
regimes had failed to address.
It does not follow however, even if centralised regimes have little credit on em-
pirical (or anecdotal) grounds, that the more decentralised structures are bereft
of such problems. While the transition to decentralisation may address several
of the eﬃciency issues mentioned before, it creates new problems. For example,
5local capture of governments and inappropriate accountability systems may stand
in the way of the decentralisation process and overturn the beneﬁts of allocative
eﬃciency. Other sources of complications include the existence of agency prob-
lems, information asymmetries, deﬁcient monitoring of sub-national governments
and problems arising due to vertical ﬁscal imbalances. These and other related
topics form an important part of the recent and current research on ﬁscal federal-
ism and decentralisation which aims to integrate political economy considerations
in the traditional approach. As noted by Bardhan (2002), these considerations
are specially relevant in developing countries where the political and institutional
framework at the sub-national level is often very weak. Learning why and how
these problems arise and develop under diﬀerent governmental arrangements and
the consequences they have for development is essential in order to inform the
discussion on these matters. Our aim in this chapter is to contribute to the under-
standing of the complex interactions between decentralisation and development
by focusing on a speciﬁc aspect of this relation, namely corruption.
Public sector corruption aﬀects development in several ways, the more obvious
being the allocation of resources away from productive activities and the squan-
dering of public funds. There are however more subtle ways in which corruption
may distort incentives and modify behaviour of economic agents bearing impli-
cations for development. Once recognised, it becomes clear that the analysis of
the relationship between corruption and development should be approached using
many diﬀerent conﬁgurations of assumptions. These eﬀorts have produced a large
body of literature studying this relation at several levels6.
Among the most debated topics in the decentralisation and development litera-
ture, an interesting idea concerns the possibility that the nature, extent and eﬀects
of bureaucratic corruption may be sensitive to the design of the relations between
(and within) diﬀerent levels of government. This suggestion, made by Shleifer and
Vishny (1993), Prud’homme (1994), Oates (1999), and Bardhan (2002), has intro-
duced yet another level to the debate on the beneﬁts of decentralisation for both
industrialized and developing countries. If we consider this possibility seriously,
then it is important to incorporate these considerations into any analysis of the
6For an excellent survey on corruption and development see Bardhan (1997). Aidt (2003)
surveys a number of theoretical approaches to corruption and Jain (2001) reviews some important
theoretical and empirical aspects of corruption.
6problems of corruption and test the robustness of results.
The potential importance of institutional features in a world of increased decen-
tralisation noted above forms one of the main motives for this study. There are
several reasons to believe that the nature and scope of bureaucratic corruption are
likely to be diﬀerent under centralised and decentralised government structures.
Some of these reasons have been analysed in the literature of the new political
economy of decentralisation in the form of information asymmetries [Bird (1994)],
political accountability [Seabright (1996)], capture by elite groups [Bardhan and
Mookherjee (2000)], yardstick competition [Besley and Case (1995)], conﬂict of
interests [Blanchard and Shleifer (2001)], and structural organisation of bribery
[Shleifer and Vishny (1993)]. Some of these elements may inﬂuence the decision of
a bureaucrat to be corrupt and they may also aﬀect the extent of corruption in an
economy. Hence, we will study the suggestion that the eﬀect of centralisation and
decentralisation on development may depend on the nature and extent of corrup-
tion using a dynamic general equilibrium approach. We develop this framework
in the next section and specify the potential implications that this may have on
policy design and implementation.
Reviewing the anecdotal and case-study evidence over the last two or three decades,
we ﬁnd a common pattern of meagre success (if any) of decentralisation pro-
grammes among developing countries. This is the case for example of Indonesia, a
highly centralised country which has implemented a decentralisation process with
very unimpressive results to date7. Some Latin American countries, like Argentina,
Chile and Colombia, experienced mixed results following the decentralisation of
certain public services and in particular of education during the 80’s and early
90’s. On one hand, some improvements were achieved in terms of educational
indicators but on the other hand, the sub-national levels found extremely burden-
some to cope with the new services and this led to overspending, mismanagement,
and rising provincial and municipal debts. In all cases, the way in which the ac-
countability relationships were set to work determined the success or failure of the
decentralisation programme. With the exception of Nicaragua and El Salvador,
all the countries failed to ensure these accountability relationships and decentrali-
7Some of the obstacles the decentralisation program has encountered in Indonesia are de-
scribed in Decentralize Indonesia without dismantling it, International Herald Tribune, 23 Jan-
uary 2001.
7sation brought along new problems8. These examples also extend to some African
countries where problems of accountability and corruption have sprung following
decentralisation attempts.
This chapter study the relationship between corruption and decentralisation from
a macroeconomic perspective. Given that the eﬀects of any decentralisation pro-
gramme are ultimately spread to the aggregate variables, this has some value.
Providing a macroeconomic analysis may also help to understand better the links
and channels between corruption and economic development. We put the em-
phasis on the relation between the existence of corruption, the power-sharing ar-
rangements between the governments and economic development. The analysis
presented in this model is unique in that provides an explicit formulation of the
relationship between corruption, decentralisation and economic development. We
bring together the theoretical and empirical predictions of both the traditional and
modern ﬁscal federalism theories and ﬁnd that the eﬀect of decentralisation on de-
velopment depends crucially on the existence and extent of corruption. Without
corruption, decentralisation is unambiguously the best outcome for development.
However, if corruption is pervasive, decentralisation may be associated to lower
capital accumulation than centralisation. This result is more likely to be observed
in developing countries with weak local political institutions and signiﬁcant infor-
mation asymmetries between the government and local administrations.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents
the model introducing the agents and their motivations. Section 3 analyzes the in-
centive condition for agents to be corrupt and examines the presence of corruption
in the model. In section 4 we derive the expressions for the budget equation and
taxes under corruption and no-corruption. Section 5.1 deals with the case of a cen-
tralised economy under corruption and no-corruption. Section 5.2 analyzes what
happens when the economy is decentralised and the corresponding implications
for corruption and development. Section 6 concludes.
8Di Gropello (2004) provides a detailed account of several experiences of educational decen-
tralisation in Latin American countries and their rather unimpressive results. The substantial
overspending and lack of accountability of sub-national administrations following these and other
decentralisation programmes has been a cause of concern ever since.
82 The Model
We develop a dynamic macroeconomic growth model with public services [Barro
(1990)], corruption, poverty traps and development [Ehrlich and Lui (1999), Mauro
(2004), Blackburn et al. (2006)]. These models have certain common features,
most important amongst which include the existence of multiple equilibria and de-
velopment traps originating from the interaction between opposing forces. While
Ehrlich and Lui (1999) put the emphasis on the trade-oﬀ between socially unpro-
ductive political capital and growth-enhancing human capital, Mauro (2004) and
Blackburn et al. (2006) base their analysis around the incentives faced by oﬃcials
to engage in corruption. Our model follow more closely the latter.
2.1 Environment
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0,1,...,∞. All agents live for two-periods only
and belong to overlapping generations of dynastic families. There are two groups of
agents -households and bureaucrats9. Total population is constant and normalised
to 1, a proportion m of which are households and n are bureaucrats (n < m).
All agents work and save during the ﬁrst period and consume only in the second
period. Households work for private ﬁrms in exchange for a wage while bureaucrats
work for the government implementing policy. Policies are designed by politicians,
who are part of the government, and it is they that are in charge of monitoring
the activities of the bureaucrats10. Public policy consists of a package of taxes and
expenditures, G, destined to provide public goods and services. Corruption arises
when, under certain conditions, bureaucrats are willing and able to appropriate
public funds in an unlawful manner thereby reducing the eﬀective level of provision
of public goods and services destined to productive activities. In order to avoid
certain rigidities imposed by the settings of our model, we assume that, no matter
how strong the incentives to engage in corruption, there will always be a core of
9We assume away the occupational choice problem by making agents diﬀerentiated at birth.
The skills required to become a bureaucrat are only possessed by a fraction of the population.
Later on, when we refer to the behaviour of bureaucrats, we specify a condition by which they
are induced to take public oﬃce rather than working in the private sector.
10For simplicity, we see the government as a benevolent policy maker. As we are only dealing
with bureaucratic corruption, we do not consider the possibility of elections incentives or a
corrupt government in our chapter.
9non-corruptible (and hence non-corrupt) agents. In this way, we assume that a
proportion ν ∈ (0,1) of all the bureaucrats are corruptible while the remaining
1 − ν are non-corruptible, and by deﬁnition, never corrupt11. On the other hand,
all the other agents undertake activities in the private sector and their behaviour
may be indirectly inﬂuenced by bureaucratic behaviour. Households work for
private ﬁrms who, in turn, combine labour and capital to produce ﬁnal output.
All markets are perfectly competitive and payments to the productive factors are
equal to their marginal products.
2.2 Households
Young households -households in the ﬁrst period- are endowed with λ > 1 units of
labour which they supply inelastically to ﬁrms in return for a wage wt. Total labour
supply in the economy amounts to lt = λm. In addition to their labour income,
each young household receives a bequest bt from the previous generation12. They
are also liable to pay taxes out of their gross income. For simplicity we assume
they pay a lump-sum tax τt and their net lifetime income is therefore equal to
λwt − τt + bt. Households save their entire net income at the market interest rate
to pay for private consumption and bequests left at the end of their lives in the
second period13. Each household derives linear utility from their consumption of
private goods and also from their donations to their oﬀspring. Consequently, his
lifetime income and utility are given by:
y
h
i = (1 + rt+1)[λwt − τt + bt] (2.1)
U
h
i = (1 + rt+1)[λwt − τt + bt] − bt+1 + u(bt+1) (2.2)
11We should also note at this point that the identity of a bureaucrat, that is whether he is of
the corruptible or non-corruptible type, is unobservable to the government.
12The introduction of bequests into the model is made for purely technical reasons. As we
are not interested in modelling bequests motives, we therefore choose a very simple formulation
and with warm-glow altruism where parents leave a part of their earnings to their oﬀspring and
derive utility from this donation as originally suggested by Yaari (1965).
13In our model, unlike similar papers in the literature, households savings are not directly
aﬀected by the activities of bureaucrats but rather indirectly via the eﬀect embezzlement of
government funds has on the level of taxation.
10where rt+1 is the market interest rate on household savings and u(bt+1) is a non-
decreasing and strictly concave function that reﬂects the “joy-of-giving” motive
associated to leaving bequests. Utility is maximized by the household by setting
ub(·) = 1 which implies a ﬁxed-amount intergenerational bequest equal to b for
all t. We should note that households earnings (and savings) are only aﬀected
by changes in wages and the tax level. As we shall see in the next sections,
bureaucratic behaviour will aﬀect these and may have important implications for
the level of development.
2.3 The Government
The government enters the model through the eﬀect public spending has on pri-
vate output. In particular, we assume as in Barro (1990) that spending in public
goods and services, G, is an input to the production function. Each unit of public
spending G yields an amount σG, (σ ≤ 1) units of productive service. Once the
government decides on the total amount of public spending, it then delegates the
implementation and arrangements to bureaucrats. It is important to note that
in our model the design of policies is the sole responsibility of the government
(politicians)14. Bureaucrats only have authority over the implementation of
public policies15. Designing a policy package entails deciding the amount of public
spending to be allocated to each bureaucrat gi
t such that
n P
i=1
gi = ng = G. Politi-
cians will then allocate the funds to the respective bureaucrats who will carry out
the implementation of the policies. We also note that bureaucrats are respon-
sible for the collection of taxes from households but we rule out the possibility
of collusion between bureaucrats and households to avoid the payment16. As in
previous analysis [Blackburn et al. (2006), Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2006)]
we assume that the government pays each a bureaucrat a wage equal to the one
paid by ﬁrms in the private sector. In doing so, the government ensures complete
14Alesina and Tabellini (2004) consider a model where politicians and bureaucrats have dif-
ferent objectives and where elections have a role in the model. The objective of that paper is
diﬀerent to our objective here although it would be possible, in principle, to incorporate elections
and politician incentives in our model.
15Although this may be seem as too extreme, it is in fact true that in most policy areas
bureaucrats act under the supervision of politicians and have only marginal or limited authority
over many decisions. See Peters (2001) for reference.
16This activity may generate opportunities for public abuse in the form of bribery and tax
evasion. However, as all households have the same labour endowment and income, and are also
subject to the same tax liability, corruption of this form does not arise in our model.
11bureaucratic participation. If a bureaucrat is discovered to be corrupt, the gov-
ernment ﬁres him and strips him oﬀ his wage while recouping a fraction δ of the
amount stolen.
The government ﬁnances its public expenditures by running a continuously bal-
anced budget. Government revenues consist of taxes imposed on households plus
any ﬁnes collected from bureaucrats who are found corrupt. The government
knows the amount of tax revenue it should collect in the absence of corruption
since it sets the tax rate and knows the number of tax-paying households17. If rev-
enues fall short of this amount then the government will suspect that corruption
is taking place. In this case, the government decides to investigate the activities
of bureaucrats by using an imprecise costless monitoring technology18. In any
case, the government is only able to detect and punish corrupt bureaucrats with a
probability p ∈ (0,1) and with probability 1 − p the governments fails to capture
the wrongdoers.
2.4 Bureaucrats
Following Ehrlich and Lui (1999) we assume that government intervention in the
economy necessitates the existence and active participation of a bureaucratic sec-
tor19. As we have already mentioned, bureaucrats are appointed by the govern-
ment (politicians) to implement a set of public policies. We assume that the
bureaucratic sector has an informational advantage over the government and this
asymmetry is also behind the inability to precisely monitor corrupt oﬃcials20. Al-
17We abstract from considering other problems that may aﬀect the certainty of tax revenues
such as tax evasion.
18For the sake of simplicity and to save on notation, we assume that government monitoring
is costless. This may be reasonable if we think that ex-post monitoring is a rather negligible
fraction of total government expenditures. In any case, costly monitoring could be added into the
model in a straightforward way without modifying the main results. In fact, it would strengthen
our results since costly monitoring of corrupt bureaucrats adds an extra loss of resources to the
economy.
19The complexity of modern government structures makes it impossible for the government to
make policy interventions without recurring to bureaucrats. As noted by Banerjee (1997) and
Acemoglu and Verdier (1998), the agency problems created as a consequence of this are one of
the crucial issues behind the existence of bureaucratic corruption.
20There are a number of treatments that examine in detail the role of public bureaus. In par-
ticular, Peters (2001) provides such an account and a detailed account of the nature, behaviour
and motivations of modern bureaucracies. We assume that bureaucrats have no power over the
design of policies, they are only able to alter its implementation.
12though not directly accountable to the citizens they are certain to be ﬁred by the
government if found corrupt while holding oﬃce.
All bureaucrats earn a wage wB
t for supplying inelastically their unit of labour
endowment. Like households, bureaucrats save their total income during the ﬁrst
period for consumption in the second period. For simplicity, we assume that wages
are the only source of legal income for bureaucrats and that these are equal to
the wages paid in the private sector by ﬁrms. We have already noted that there
are two types of bureaucrats -corruptible and non-corruptible-. By deﬁnition, a
non-corruptible bureaucrat is never corrupt and resorts to his legal income only.
Accordingly, his income is always certain and equal to wb
t = wt. The lifetime
income and utility of a non-corruptible bureaucrat are therefore given by:
y
nc,b = w
b
t (2.3)
U
nc,b = w
b
t(1 + rt+1) (2.4)
A corruptible bureaucrat may or may not decide to engage in corruption. In
particular, any such bureaucrat will evaluate the (expected) beneﬁts of engaging in
corruption against the beneﬁts of remaining honest. If he decides against engaging
in corruption, then his income and utility are given by equation 2.3 and 2.4. If a
bureaucrat decides to engage in corruption he embezzles a fraction θi
t ∈ (0,1) of
his public funds allocation g. For simplicity we assume that each bureaucrat steals
the same fraction out of government funds, hence θt = θ21. Therefore, the income
of a corrupt bureaucrat is equal to wb
t(1+rt+1)+θtg with probability (1−p) and
with probability p he is caught and ﬁred earning (1 − δ)θtg22. We can write the
21Naturally, the fraction a given bureaucrat may be able to steal depends on several factors.
One of them is the probability of detection which in our model is constant for a same-level
bureaucrats as we later explain. Another factor is the “oﬃce power” of a bureaucrat relative to
other bureaucrats. Although it is likely that there are diﬀerences in this, we assume the simplest
case where all bureaucrats are alike in terms of “oﬃce power”. We discuss this issue in more
detail later in the chapter.
22To leave things simple, we rule out the possibility of investing embezzled funds in either the
formal or informal sector. In this way, bureaucrats have to spend or hide their illegal income.
Other possibilities have been analysed in the literature, such as spending additional resources
to avoid being caught [Blackburn et al. (2006)] or by shipping the embezzled funds abroad
[Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2006)].
13expected income and utility of a corrupt bureaucrat as:
U
b,c = w
b
t(1 + rt+1)(1 − p) + θtg(1 − pδ) (2.5)
2.5 Firms
Output is produced by ﬁrms which hire labour from households and rent capital
(loans) from all agents. There is a unit mass of identical output producers. The
representative ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts. The production technology of the represen-
tative ﬁrm is given by:
yt = Al
α
t K
α
t k
1−α
t G
β A > 0 ; α,β ∈ (0,1) (2.6)
where lt are labour units, Kt denotes the aggregate stock of capital and Gt de-
notes total amount of productive services yielded by public spending23. Labour
is hired at the competitive wage rate wt and capital is rented at the compet-
itive rate rt. Proﬁt maximization implies wt = αAl
α−1
t Kα
t k
1−α
t G
β
t and rt =
(1 − α)Alα
t Kα
t k
−α
t G
β
t . Since in equilibrium lt = l = λm and kt = Kt, we can
write these as:
wt = αA(λm)
α−1G
βkt ≡ w(kt) (2.7)
rt = (1 − α)A(λm)
αG
β ≡ r (2.8)
We can observe that the wage rate is proportional to the capital stock whereas
the equilibrium interest rate is constant.
23We incorporate both an economy-wide capital as in Romer (1986) and the services provided
by the public goods and services into the production function as in Barro (1990) as inputs
enhancing the eﬃciency of private production.
143 The incentive to be corrupt
Having presented the utilities and optimization conditions for all the agents, it
should be clear by now that corruptible bureaucrats face a decision on whether
to engage in corruption or not. In particular, they will do so if their expected
beneﬁts are no less than the beneﬁts of remaining honest. From equation 2.5 and
noting that rt = rt+1 = r we can write this condition as:
wt(1 + r)(1 − p) + θg(1 − pδ) ≥ wt(1 + r) (3.1)
where the left-hand side term is his expected utility of embezzling funds and the
right-hand side term is his utility if he is honest. This expression can be rearranged
conveniently to yield:
θg(1 − pδ) ≥ pwt(1 + r) (3.2)
One crucial aspect of condition 3.2 is that it includes the economy-wide variables
wt and r. As we will see, both variables are functions of the aggregate level of
corruption in the economy. This means that the motivation for a bureaucrat to
engage in corruption will be aﬀected by the decisions adopted by fellow bureau-
crats.
We can start exploring these motivations by analyzing two alternative and extreme
scenarios, one in which all bureaucrats are honest and one in which all bureaucrats
are corrupt. We should remember at this point that corrupt behaviour aﬀects the
economy through a reduction in the available amount of public productive services
which are themselves an input into the production function of output by ﬁrms.
In this sense, only the “ﬁnal” amount of public goods and services enters the
production function and is denoted by Gt in equations 2.7 and 2.8. This means
that, if corruption exists, there will be a diﬀerence between the amount of public
funds the government decided to provide and the amount of public funds destined
to productive activities.
We start by considering the case where all corruptible bureaucrats are honest.
In this case, total government expenditure equals total public services delivered
15yielding G = ˆ G = nσg in productive services. Accordingly, the incentive condition
3.2 becomes:
θg(1 − pδ) ≥ (1 + ˆ r)p ˆ wt ≡ ˆ ζ(kt) (3.3)
where
ˆ r = (1 − α)A(λm)
ασ
β(ng)
β (3.4)
ˆ wt = αA(λm)
α−1σ
β(ng)
βkt ≡ ˆ w(kt) (3.5)
The incentive condition given in 3.3 is the incentive condition for an individual
bureaucrat to be corrupt given that no other bureaucrat is corrupt.
On the other hand, if all corruptible bureaucrats decide to engage in corruption
and they embezzle a fraction θ out of public funds, then the total amount of public
productive services delivered will be equal to G = ˜ G = nσg(1 − θ). The incentive
condition in this case becomes:
θg(1 − pδ) ≥ (1 + ˜ r)p ˜ wt ≡ ˜ ζ(kt) (3.6)
where
˜ r = (1 − α)A(λm)
ασ
β(ng)
β(1 − θ)
β (3.7)
˜ wt = αA(λm)
α−1σ
β(ng)
β(1 − θ)
βkt ≡ ˜ w(kt) (3.8)
Expression 3.6 is the condition for and individual corruptible bureaucrat to engage
in corruption given that all other corruptible bureaucrats are also corrupt.
We can see that the only diﬀerence between the two set of equations for the wage
rate and interest rate is the presence of the term (1 − θ) as an argument of these
16expressions for the all-corruption case. Given that (1−θ) is between 0 and 1 (since
0 < θ < 1), it is clear that for any given stock of capital the wage rate is lower
under corruption than under no-corruption. Similarly, if we compare equations
3.4 and 3.7, we see that for any given stock of capital the interest rate is also
lower when corruption exists. The economic explanation of this is that the total
amount of public productive services under the presence of corruption is smaller
( ˜ G < ˆ G), which reduces the productivity of the other inputs in the production of
private goods.
4 Corruption and public ﬁnances
In the previous section, we established the condition for a bureaucrat to be corrupt
under two diﬀerent hypothetical scenarios. We also showed how the existence of
corruption aﬀected certain economy-wide variables such as wages and interest
rates. We also noted earlier that changes in households (and bureaucrats) savings
were triggered by changes in taxes and wages. It should be clear that wages are
aﬀected in the presence of corruption and that this aﬀects the net earnings (and
savings) of both households and bureaucrats. Now we study how are taxes aﬀected
by the existence of corruption and the eﬀect this has on savings.
Since the government maintains a balanced budget each period it is essential to
examine the budget equation under the two proposed scenarios for the level of
taxes will be diﬀerent in each case. First, if corruption is absent in the economy,
government expenditures comprise wages paid to bureaucrats and spending on
publics goods and services. Revenues consist of tax receipts from all households.
In this case, the budget equation looks like:
mτ = ng + n ˆ wt (4.1)
We can determine the amount of taxes levied on households when all corruptible
bureaucrats are honest as the following:
τ =
ng + n ˆ wt
m
≡ ˆ τ (4.2)
17In comparison we consider the situation where all corruptible bureaucrats are
indeed corrupt. In this case, each bureaucrat embezzles θg with probability (1−p)
and if caught and ﬁred (with probability p), he retains θg(1 − δ). Accordingly,
government expenditures comprise wages paid to bureaucrats and spending on
public goods and services. However, unlike the previous case, both total wages
and spending are aﬀected. This occurs in part because there is a proportion
of corrupt bureaucrats who are caught and dismissed without pay, government
expenditure on wages are reduced by npν ˜ wt -the salaries of corrupt bureaucrats
who are ﬁred. It also occurs because as bureaucrats steal government funds that
otherwise would have constituted tax receipts, the government losses nνθg(1−pδ)
in public funds to corrupt bureaucrats that get away with their malfeasance24.
Under these conditions, the budget equation becomes:
mτ = ng + n ˜ wt(1 − pν) + c + nνθg(1 − pδ) (4.3)
and the level of taxes levied on households when all corruptible bureaucrats are
corrupt is given by:
τ =
ng + n ˜ wt(1 − pν) + c + nνθg(1 − pδ)
m
≡ ˜ τ (4.4)
Comparing equations 4.2 and 4.4, we see that the level of taxes under corruption
may be higher or lower than under no-corruption. This is because while corruption
results in the loss of public funds (embezzled funds), it also leads to lower payments
of wages to bureaucrats (given that a fraction p of bureaucrats are caught and ﬁred
without pay). In fact, taxes under corruption will be higher only if n ˜ wt(1−pν)+
nνθg(1 − pδ) > n ˆ wt. Note that we can see the total amount of embezzled funds
nνθg(1−pδ) as an indication of the aggregate impact of corruption. Accordingly,
the incidence of corruption in the economy will be larger the higher the fraction
of corruptible bureaucrats, ν, the higher the funds allocated to each bureaucrat g,
the lower the probability of detection p, and the lower the fraction the government
is able to recover out of funds embezzled by bureaucrats who are caught δ. We are
now ready to analyse how corruption aﬀects capital accumulation in the economy.
24Note that this amount is the result of the total amount of embezzled funds nvθg minus the
funds that are recovered from corrupt bureaucrats that are caught nvpθgδ.
18We explore this possibility by analysing two alternative scenarios.
5 Regimes and development
In this section we address the issue of determining diﬀerent regimes of corruption
and development by focusing on the structural organisation of public service de-
livery. In particular, we focus on two alternative extreme cases, full centralisation
and full decentralisation. In order to incorporate the ﬁscal federalism propositions
into this model we assume that regardless of whether corruption exists or not, de-
centralised provision of public goods and services is more (economically) eﬃcient
than centralised provision. This assumption is meant to capture the diﬀerences
-widely acknowledged and recognised in the literature- in the eﬃciency of public
service delivery between centralisation and decentralisation. To keep the analysis
simple, we assume that the parameter σ, which represents the economic eﬃciency
associated to the provision of public goods and services, is larger under decen-
tralisation than under centralisation. In particular, we assume that σc < 1 and
σd = 1. We analyse the case of centralisation ﬁrst.
5.1 Centralisation and development
In this section, we consider the case of an economy where the provision of public
services is carried out by central level bureaucrats only. Probably the best way to
think about this situation is one where local or regional bureaucrats have limited
powers or no powers at all. In such a case, top-level or central bureaucrats are re-
sponsible for the nationwide administration and delivery of public services. In such
a conﬁguration, we assume that the informational asymmetry problem between
central bureaucrats and the government is limited. Even when the bureaucrats at
this level may be better informed than the government about embezzlement op-
portunities, the fact that these bureaucrats are “closer” to the central government
(not only in geographical terms but more importantly in hierarchical terms) eases
the monitoring tasks by the government. It is well agreed that monitoring and
auditing are better developed and more eﬃcient at the national than at the local
or regional level [Prud’homme (1995)]. Additionally, one may think that in this
type of setting bureaucrats constitute a more or less homogenous and cohesive
19group which facilitates the monitoring tasks. The introduction of this assumption
will aﬀect θ which is labeled θc in this scenario.
We can now study how accumulation takes place in a corruption-free environment.
In this case, both households and bureaucrats save their legal income. The sum
of net savings by households and bureaucrats yields the total amount of savings
in the economy as follows:
ˆ st = m(λ ˆ wt − ˆ τt + b) + n ˆ wt (5.1)
where m(λ ˆ wt − τt + b) are total household savings and n ˆ wt are total bureaucrat
savings. Using equations 3.5 and 4.1 to rewrite equation 5.1 it follows that capital
accumulation occurs in the following way:
ˆ k
c
t+1 = αA(λm)
α(σ
c)
β(ng)
βkt − ng + mb ≡ ˆ f
c(kt) (5.2)
Now we consider the case where the economy is aﬀected by corruption. As we know
from the previous discussion, this is the case where all corruptible bureaucrats
are corrupt. In this situation, total savings comprise the net total savings by
households plus the savings of all bureaucrats which are diﬀerent from the non-
corruption case. Note also that a number (1−ν)n of bureaucrats (non-corruptible)
are able to save their legal income, but the group of corruptible bureaucrats will
have an expected level of savings equal to νn(1 − p)˜ wt. Thus, the wage that
both corruptible and non-corruptible bureaucrats receive is lower than wage in
the non-corruption case. In this way, total savings are given by:
ˆ st = m(λ ˜ wt − ˜ τt + b) + (1 − ν)n ˜ wt + νn(1 − p)˜ wt (5.3)
Replacing ˜ wt and ˜ τt by their equals in equations 3.8 and 4.4 and plugging them
into 5.3, we can derive the capital accumulation equation for the case where all
corruptible bureaucrats are corrupt as:
˜ k
c
t+1 = αA(λm)
α(σ
c)
β(ng)
β(1 − θ
c)
βkt − ng[1 + νθ
c(1 − pδ)] + mb ≡ ˜ f
c(kt) (5.4)
20Working with 5.2 and 5.4, we can ﬁnd the steady state levels of capital for each
case as the following:
ˆ k
c,∗ =
mb − ng
1 − αA(λm)α(σc)β(ng)β (5.5)
˜ k
c,∗ =
mb − ng[1 + νθc(1 − pδ)]
1 − αA(λm)α(σc)β(ng)β(1 − θc)β (5.6)
These steady state levels of capital are stationary if both mb > ng[1+νθ(1−pδ)]
and if αA(λm)α(σc)β(ng)β ∈ (0,1) are satisﬁed25.
From equations 5.5 and 5.6, it is evident that capital accumulation is lower under
corruption than under no-corruption, that is ˜ kc,∗ < ˆ kc,∗26. The intuition behind
this can be seen by remembering how corruption aﬀects the main variables. First,
as we have already noted, at every level of capital, the marginal productivity of
labour is lower under corruption than no-corruption. The rationale behind this
is that when bureaucrats embezzle public funds, the amount of public spending
injected in the economy is lower and this reduces the productivity of labour and
hence wages. Second, corruption raises the total costs of public goods causing
taxes to be higher and resulting in lower total savings.
It is important to stress the result that corruption is harmful to development and
that this is due to the loss of public resources and the decrease in public spending
in goods and services. Furthermore, we are able to establish that corruption not
only aﬀects development but low development aﬀects corruption. This follows
from section 3 noting that ˆ ζ(kt) > ˜ ζ(kt). One can clearly observe that both
conditions are increasing monotonically in kt. It is easy to show that there exist
two critical levels of capital k∗
1 and k∗
2 such that:
Deﬁnition k1,b is the unique value of kt for which ˆ ζ(k1,b) = θg(1 − pδ) such that
ˆ ζ(·) < θg(1 − pδ) for all kt < k1,b and ˆ ζ(·) > θg(1 − pδ) for all kt > k1,b.
25Note that if mb > ng[1 + νθ(1 − pδ)] then it is true that mb > ng. The same observation
is valid for the other condition since if αA(λm)α(σc)β(ng)β ∈ (0,1) then it is also true that
αA(λm)α(σc)β(ng)β(1 − θc)β ∈ (0,1).
26This follows from the evidence that for any given kt, ˜ fc(·) < ˆ fc(·).
21Deﬁnition k2,b is the unique value of kt for which ˜ ζ(k2,b) = θg(1 − pδ) such that
˜ ζ(·) < θg(1 − pδ) for all kt < k2,b and ˜ ζ(·) > θg(1 − pδ) for all kt > k2,b.
It is clear that k1,b < k2,b and that these capital levels deﬁne boundaries beyond
which the incentive conditions given in section 3 are satisﬁed or not. Using these
critical capital levels, we can now determine whether corruption forms part or
not of an equilibrium. In particular, if kt < k1,b, there exists an equilibrium in
which all corruptible bureaucrats are corrupt. And if kt > k2,b, there exists an
equilibrium in which all corruptible bureaucrats are non-corrupt. Finally, if k1,b <
kt < k2,b, it results in multiple equilibria where bureaucrats are either corrupt or
non-corrupt. These two results validate the other side of our argument, i.e. that
low levels of development are associated to high corruption and viceversa27. As
we can infer, these results give rise to three diﬀerent development regimes. The
ﬁrst, a low-development regime where there is a unique stable equilibrium and
for which corruption is part of the economy (in fact, corruption is at a maximum
in this regime). The second, a high-development regime where there is a unique
stable equilibrium and for which corruption is not part of the economy (there
is zero corruption). Finally, an intermediate-development regime where there are
multiple equilibria which are frequency dependent, i.e. the decision of a corruptible
bureaucrat to be corrupt will rely heavily on the number of other bureaucrats who
are corrupt or not. These results are represented in ﬁgure 1.
5.2 Decentralisation and development
In this section we focus on the determination of capital accumulation under a
regime of bureaucratic decentralisation. Unlike the previous regime where local
bureaucrats had no involvement in the implementation of policies, in this case the
economy consists only of local level bureaucrats whose functions are to implement
the provision of public goods and services decided by the national government28.
In this conﬁguration, the informational asymmetries between the government and
27Although these cases imply total and zero corruption, in practice there always remains still
a core of non-corruptible and non-corrupt bureaucrats.
28In order to keep the modelling simple, we consider only one level of sub-national governments,
the local level, which we think of being the lowest level. We could alternatively include a
provincial or regional level but this would probably add more complexity without inﬂuencing
the main results. In fact, the implicit assumption here is that the more layers in the structure
the larger the information asymmetry associated to the lowest level.
22Figure 1: Corruption and development. Parameter values: α = 0.4, A = 3,
λ = 1, m = 0.6, n = 0.2, g = 1.4, b = 0.6, ν = 0.3, p = 0.5, δ = 0.5, β = 0.2,
σc = 0.7, θc = 0.25 and θd = 0.75.
23the local or decentralised bureaucrats are signiﬁcantly larger than in the cen-
tralised case. We have already noted the reasons why this is likely to be the case.
In addition, several other reasons support this assumption. Some of these are
summarized in convincingly pointed by Bardhan (2002) and include local capture,
lax accountability relationships and deﬁcient monitoring and information systems
at the local levels. For the reasons mentioned, we make the assumption that the
fraction each decentralised bureaucrat is able to steal is larger than in centralisa-
tion, θd > θc. This assumption is meant to capture the idea that informational
asymmetries are not only more relevant in a decentralised setting but also that
local bureaucrats are more loosely controlled and have greater ability to embezzle
a higher proportion of public funds. This assumption can be justiﬁed to make for
two reasons. First, the hierarchical “distance” between the government and local
level bureaucrats aﬀords decentralised bureaucrats greater latitude to embezzle
funds. This is perhaps better described as representing a weak accountability
relationship between the local bureaucrat and the central government. Second, lo-
cal bureaucrats have usually fewer obstacles and greater incentives to be corrupt.
Prud’homme (1995) notes for example that local bureaucrats are usually able to
establish unethical relationships with local interest groups since they spend spells
in the oﬃce in the same location. Others point to the presumption that bureau-
cratic careers are longer and more stable at the national than at the local level. If
the time-horizon for local bureaucrats is shorter, then it might be reasonable to as-
sume that they steal higher proportions of public funds29. The theories presented
by Aghion and Tirole (1997), Bac (1996) and Carbonara (1998) also suggest that
this is a sensible assumption to make.
First we explore the case where corruption is absent. Recall that in this case
both households and bureaucrats save the same as in the centralisation regime.
Remember that in this case σc < σd = 1. The expression of total supply of loans
which equals aggregate savings is therefore equal to:
ˆ st = m(λ ˆ wt − ˆ τt + b) + n ˆ wt (5.7)
where m(λ ˆ wt − τt + b) are total household savings and n ˆ wt are total bureaucrat
29Or for that matter, engage in aggressive rent-seeking and bribe-taking since they seek to
make up for the expected shorter career span.
24savings as before. Using equations 3.5 and 4.1 to rewrite equation 5.7 it follows
that the expression for capital accumulation in a corruption-free decentralised
setting is equal to:
ˆ k
d
t+1 = αA(λm)
α(ng)
βkt − ng + mb ≡ ˆ f
d(kt) (5.8)
since σd = 1. Note that for any given kt, the corresponding level of kt+1 is higher
in this case than in the centralisation case. This is due to the eﬀect the greater
eﬃciency associated to decentralisation of public service relative to the centralised
case, σd > σc.
When all corruptible bureaucrats are corrupt households savings become m(λ ˜ wt−
˜ τt+b) (note that both wages and taxes aﬀect households savings) and bureaucrats
savings equal (1−ν)n ˜ wt+νn(1−p)˜ wt. This level of total savings is similar to the
one we obtained for the case of corruption and centralisation but in this case the
eﬃciency of public goods and services, σd is equal to 1. Using the expressions for
3.8, and 4.3 we are able to obtain the expression for capital accumulation under
extreme corruption and decentralisation:
˜ k
d
t+1 = αA(λm)
α(ng)
β(1 − θ
d)
βkt − ng[1 + νθ
d(1 − pδ)] + mb ≡ ˜ f
d(kt) (5.9)
We are ready now to obtain the steady state capital levels for these two cases.
Starting from equations 5.8 and 5.9 we can derive two expressions for the steady
state capital level in a decentralised regime with and without corruption yielding:
ˆ k
d,∗ =
mb − ng
1 − αA(λm)α(ng)β (5.10)
˜ k
d,∗ =
mb − ng[1 + νθd(1 − pδ)]
1 − αA(λm)α(ng)β(1 − θd)β (5.11)
In order to guarantee the stationarity of these equilibrium points it must be true
25that both mb > ng[1 + νθd(1 − pδ)] and αA(λm)α(ng)β ∈ (0,1) are satisﬁed30.
Similarly to the centralised case, we have that capital accumulation is lower under
corruption, ˜ kd,∗ < ˆ kd,∗ since ˜ fd(kt) < ˆ fd(kt) for any given kt
31. From this analysis,
we can derive another important result. Note that direct comparison of equations
5.6 and 5.11 is not able to reveal whether decentralisation of public service delivery
under the presence of corruption is preferred to centralisation in similar circum-
stances. If we look more closely at these equations we see that the numerator in
5.6 is larger than the numerator in 5.11 (this is mainly due to the extra loss in
public resources generated in a decentralised setting). And from the denominator
we see that there are two opposing forces, the eﬃciency of public spending and
the proportion bureaucrats are able steal out of public funds. Comparing these
we arrive at the following condition:
[1 − θ
d]
β < (σ
c)
β[1 − θ
c]
β (5.12)
If this inequality is satisﬁed, then the extra losses in public resources due to the
institutional conditions in the decentralised economy will outweigh the extra gains
due to the better eﬃciency in public goods provision. Note that this condition
depends crucially on the relationship between the eﬃciency parameter of the cen-
tralised regime, and on the diﬀerent fraction bureaucrats are able to embezzle
in the centralised and decentralised structures. The greater and more eﬃcient
monitoring and hierarchical control of centralised bureaucrats the more likely a
decentralised economy causes further losses and harm to economic development
in the presence of corruption.
We present some simulation results in ﬁgures 2 and 3 as a way of illustrating
the main results of the model. We considered standard values for the parameters
and both simulations include the same parameters except for the economic eﬃ-
ciency and informational parameters. Note that regardless of the values of these,
decentralisation is the best outcome in terms of development in the absence of
30Note that if mb > ng[1 + νθd(1 − pδ)] then it will also be true that mb > ng. A similar
observation is valid for the other condition since if αA(λm)α(ng)β ∈ (0,1) then it is also veriﬁed
that αA(λm)α(ng)β(1 − θd)β ∈ (0,1) .
31This can also be derived comparing equations 5.10 and 5.11. The numerator in 5.10 is
larger than the numerator in 5.11 since both cd and ngνθd(1−pδ) are both positive magnitudes.
Furthermore, the denominator in 5.11 is smaller due to the presence of the term (1 − θd)β.
26Figure 2: Decentralisation, corruption and development. Parameter values:
α = 0.4, A = 3, λ = 1, m = 0.6, n = 0.2, g = 1.4, b = 0.6, ν = 0.3, p = 0.5,
δ = 0.5, β = 0.2, σc = 0.7, θc = 0.25 and θd = 0.75.
27Figure 3: Decentralisation, corruption and development. Parameter values:
α = 0.4, A = 3, λ = 1, m = 0.6, n = 0.2, g = 1.4, b = 0.6, ν = 0.3, p = 0.5,
δ = 0.5, β = 0.2, σc = 0.7, θc = 0.25 and θd = 0.3.
28corruption. However, if corruption is present in the economy, then the outcome
is ambiguous. In ﬁgure 2, where the informational diﬀerences between centralised
and decentralised structures are signiﬁcant (θd is signiﬁcantly larger than θc),
condition 5.12 is satisﬁed and a decentralised structure is associated to very low
capital levels and indeed lower than those that would be achieved in a centralised
structure. If however, the informational diﬀerences between centralised and de-
centralised structures are not very important (θd is slightly larger than θc), then
it can be seen in ﬁgure 3that decentralisation is associated to higher capital levels
than centralisation. In fact, while our model predicts than in the absence of cor-
ruption, decentralisation is the better outcome for development, we can no longer
be certain that decentralisation is the better outcome if corruption is pervasive.
6 Conclusions
Decentralisation of public ﬁnance and governance has been advocated in recent
decades by international organizations and national governments. Based on eﬃ-
ciency grounds, the idea that bringing the government closer to the people would
result in a better and more eﬃcient outcome yielding greater social welfare has
been a strong motivation to decentralise. The traditional theory of ﬁscal feder-
alism has been centred around this idea. The public choice literature considered
the role of public agents as utility maximizers and derived slightly diﬀerent impli-
cations regarding the eﬀects of decentralisation. More recently, the "new" theory
of ﬁscal federalism is characterised by the consideration of political processes and
the behaviour of public agents and the role of asymmetric information between
diﬀerent agents. All these theoretical considerations have introduced additional
complexities to the question of whether to centralise or decentralise diﬀerent gov-
ernment activities. In particular, it seems that the trade-oﬀ is between eﬃciency-
enhancing considerations stemming from the traditional theory of ﬁscal federalism
and accountability, information and incentives stemming from the recent politi-
cal economy of ﬁscal federalism. The issue is certainly more complex than it was
originally considered and there are several interrelationships between the economic
and political aspects involved.
This research has been motivated by the above considerations and the aim has
29been to provide a framework that enables us to capture some of these ideas. Our
study is an attempt to contribute to the analysis of ﬁscal federalism and develop-
ment in the presence of bureaucratic corruption. We elaborate a dynamic growth
model where corruption is endogenously determined according to the decisions
of individuals (in particular, public servants). In this context, the existence of a
centralised or decentralised structure yield diﬀerent implications in terms of the
eﬀects on economic development. Among the results of our analysis, in line with
previous research on corruption and development, is that corruption is always
adverse to economic development. This is because corruption diverts public re-
sources away from productive activities. Furthermore, our model suggests that
if corruption is absent in the economy, decentralisation is associated with greater
capital accumulation than centralisation. However, if corruption occurs, then we
show that decentralisation may be the worst alternative if there are weak institu-
tions at the local level. This is the case if monitoring is signiﬁcantly more eﬃcient
at the central level than at the local level and if the net eﬃciency gains associated
to decentralisation are not signiﬁcantly large. Finally, our model contemplates
the coexistence of corruption and poverty as permanent rather than temporary
features of an economy.
Our results are in accord with some results in the empirical literature. There
is agreement that corruption aﬀects economic development negatively via the di-
version of investible resources. Likewise, there is agreement that corruption is
also aﬀected negatively by economic development. In fact, the new directions in
empirical research conform to the hypothesis of a bivariate relationship between
corruption and development. Furthermore, there is mixed evidence regarding the
relationship between decentralisation and corruption in the empirical literature.
While there are some studies that ﬁnd that federalism is associated to more cor-
ruption in the economy, other authors have found that ﬁscal decentralisation is
associated to lower corruption. Again, the latest empirical developments suggest
that it is perhaps more convenient to adopt a more integrated approach to the
study of decentralisation and corruption considering the interrelationships between
diﬀerent aspects or types of decentralisation. The ideas presented in this chapter
accord with this if we consider that improved economic eﬃciency is associated to
certain type of decentralisation and reduced hierarchical control and informational
and monitoring problems are associated to other types of decentralisation.
30We think it would be desirable to pursue certain extensions to this analysis. The
decision to centralise or decentralise is rarely exogenous. It may be dependent on
certain features of the socio-economic system or may be part of a larger restruc-
turing of the public sector. In terms of our model, this would imply to postulate
that the degree of decentralisation is a function of the aggregate level of corrup-
tion or development or both. Another reﬁnement we may consider is making
the probability of detection endogenous. It is likely that more eﬃcient (costly)
monitoring leads to a increase in the probability of detection. Finally, it may
be important to consider the role of oﬃce-motivated politicians by incorporating
national and local elections into the model. This is likely to pit the objectives
of the bureaucrats against those of the politicians, with one possible eﬀect being
that local politicians may be more interested in monitoring local bureaucrats more
eﬃciently. This would possibly reduce the ability of local bureaucrats to embezzle
bureaucrats funds and alleviate local accountability problems.
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